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1. INTRODUCTION
"If you send me back home, I will be killed." How many
immigration agents have heard a person say words to this effect?
How many times have judges had to decide on the safety of an
immigrant requesting an order to remain in this country? For some
applicants, time is of the essence; their safety is not guaranteed if
they are deported. Nevertheless, with thousands of individuals
seeking refuge in the United States,' an efficient method of screening
refugee and asylum applicants is important, not only initially, but
also at the appeals level.
A debate regarding the difficult balance between spending an
appropriate amount of time deciding the fates of refugee and asylum
applicants against the efficiency of the process caused division within
the United States Supreme Court. At issue in Nken v. Holder is the
appeal to stay a removal order of a Cameroon citizen who applied for
asylum in the United States. Although the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) had
previously limited immigration judges' ability to grant stays for
applicants, the Court held that the broader traditional test applies to
the appeal of a stay.4 The Court held that IIRIRA applies exclusively
to injunctions.5 Because stays are outside the scope of IIRIRA, the
* Second-year law student at the Pepperdine University School of Law and
member of NAALJ journal. I am very thankful to former Judge Bruce J. Einhorn
of the United States Immigration Court for his guidance and research suggestions
prior to beginning my case note. I would also like to thank my family, friends and
professors at Pepperdine for their encouragement and support in writing this article.
1. Daniel C. Martin & Michael Hoefer, Refugees and Asylees: 2008, Office of
Immigration Statistics at 1, available at
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois rfafr 2008.pdf. For fiscal
year 2008, some 60,108 individuals were admitted into the United States as
refugees and 22,930 people were admitted as asylees. Id. Fiscal years last between
October I and September 30 of the following year. Id.
2. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009).
3. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8
U.S.C. § 1252 (2005), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
4. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
5. Id. at 1756.
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Court held that the broader traditional test applies in the case of
Nken's stay of removal, rather than the less inclusive IIRIRA test.6
This case note examines the present Supreme Court case,
analyzing the majority opinion's decision to question the logic of a
narrow legislative standard and reapply a traditional interpretation
judicial authority to decide the issue of stays. Part II outlines the
historical background of the case including an explanation of
immigration, the asylum process, pertinent case law, and the different
standards for judicial review of stays.7 Part III relates the pertinent
facts of the case.8  Part IV analyzes arguments of the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions.9 Part V explores the possible
legal and broader societal impacts of the decision.'0  Part VI
concludes the note.11
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Immigration in the United States: Refugees and Asylees
Throughout its history, the United States has drawn many
immigrants both legal and illegal.12  Thousands of individuals
seeking refuge or asylum arrive in the United States every year. In
2008 alone, 60,108 individuals were admitted into the United States
as refugees, and 22,930 people were admitted as asylees.13 As a
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 12-124 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 125-146 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 147-231 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 232-285 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 286-291 and accompanying text.
12. "Historically, the United States has been a beacon of hope for oppressed
and persecuted people and for those simply seeking a better place to live and
work." Martin S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process
Rights While Preserving the BIA's Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 281 (2007).
13. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 1. See also 2008 Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics (Aug. 2009) at 1, available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/oisyb 2008.pdf;
Refugee Arrivals: Fiscal Years 1980 to 2008, Department of Homeland Security,
available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/tablel3.xls.
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result of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (U.N. Protocol),14 ratified by the United States in 1967,
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980'1 to establish a definition
of refugees in compliance with the U.N. Protocol.16 Nevertheless,
admission of refugees is not limitless, and each year the President,
upon consulting Congress, determines an admissions ceiling for
refugees." The President increased this ceiling to 80,000 in fiscal
year 2008;18 the total number of refugees admitted during that year
alone.19 The proposed ceiling for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 is
80,000.20
14. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The Protocol was adopted in January 31, 1967, but it
entered into force October 4, 1967. James A. Sweeney, Credibility, Proof And
Refugee Law, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 700, 726 (2009); see also Susan M. Akram &
Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right
of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 162 n.8 (2004).
15. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102
(1980).
16. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2. The term "refugee" was defined
initially in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
which the United States did not ratify. Stanley Dale Radtke, Defining a Core Zone
of Protection in Asylum Law: Refocusing the Analysis of Membership in a
Particular Social Group to Utilize Both the Social Visibility and Group
Immutability Component Approaches, 10 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 22, 27-28
(2008). Nevertheless, the same definition was used in the Protocol to which the
United States later acceded. Id.
17. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2.
18. The ceiling "increased from 70,000 in 2007 to 80,000 in 2008, due to the
expected resettlement of Iraqi, Bhutanese, and Iranian refugees in the Near East,
South Asia region." Id.
19. Id.
20. U.S. Dep't of State et al., Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year
2010 Report to the Congress 5 (2009), available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/129393.pdf; Jennifer Rikoski & Jonathan
Finer, Out of Iraq: The U.S. Legal Regime Governing Iraqi Refugee Resettlement,
34 RUTGERS L. REc. 46, 53 (2009) (citing U.S. Dep't of State et al., Proposed
Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2009 Report to the Congress 50 (2008),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/113507.pdf). The
approximate target number for Iraqi refugees to be admitted in fiscal year 2009 was
17,000. Rikoski & Finer supra at 53 (citing Ambassador James B. Foley, Senior
Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues, Briefing on Developments in the Iraqi
Refugee Admissions and Assistance Programs at the U.S. Department of State
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There is a lengthy application process for an individual hoping to
become an official refugee. 2 1 To qualify for refugee status, an
applicant must: (1) "be of special humanitarian concern to the United
States;" 2 2 (2) qualify as a refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the
Immigration Nationality Act (INA); 23 (3) be admissible under INA;
(Sept. 12, 2008), available at
http://merln.ndu.edularchivepdf/iraq/State/109568.pdf).
21. See generally Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2.
22. The President determines what qualifies as a humanitarian concern after
consulting Congress, basing his decision on whether "an unforeseen emergency
refugee situation exists" and whether admitting the refugee "is justified by grave
humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest." Victoria Rapoport,
The Politicization of United States Asylum and Refugee Policies, 11 SCHOLAR
195, 199-200 (2009) (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. §
1157(b) (2007); Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e)
(2007)). Furthermore, the task of defining "refugees of special humanitarian
concern" falls on the President to be defined on "case-by-case basis in consultation
with Congress." Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing The
Impact Of U.S. Refugee Resettlement, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 951, 962 (2003)
(citing H.R. Rep. 96-608, 96th Cong. at 13; Deborah E. Anker & Michael H.
Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12-17 (1981)). Moreover, the United States uses a priority
system for accepting applicants, following the President's recommendations in his
annual report to Congress about refugee admissions. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo,
The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for Female and Child Refugees Trapped in a
Post-September 11 World, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 459, 472 (2005) (citing
UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook and Country Chapters, Ch. U.S.A. 2 (2004),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?
tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3c5e5a764). For instance, in 2005,
President Bush identified various priority groups including Cuban human right
activists, Iranian religious minorities, Jews, Evangelical Christians, and Orthodox
Church members in the former Soviet Union. Steve Swerdlow, Understanding
Post-Soviet Ethnic Discrimination and the Effective Use of U.S. Refugee
Resettlement: The Case of the Meskhetian Turks of Krasnodar Krai, 94 CAL. L.
REv. 1827, 1857 (citing Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599D, 103
Stat. 1261 (1989), as amended).
23. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2009). "Refugee"
under section 1 101(a)(42) is defined as follows:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any
country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
187Spring 2010 The Supreme Court's Take on Immigration
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and (4) not be 'firmly resettled' 24 in a foreign country. "25 The INA
is discussed in further detail below.26
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the President
after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of
this title) may specify, any person who is within the country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually
residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The
term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. For purposes of
determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced
to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or
who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that
he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be
deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion.
Id. at§ 1101(a)(42).
24. As codified under IIRIRA, "[a] person is considered to be firmly resettled
if 'prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered another country with, or
while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or
some other type of permanent resettlement."' Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively
Denied: The Detrimental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 61,
86 (2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. 208.15 (2008)). Courts require an applicant to rebut a
firm resettlement assertion by showing that it was necessary to be present in that
country "for her onward flight" and that the presence did not establish any ties, that
the applicant was not offered to resettle, and that the applicant's movements "were
so restricted by the authority of the country as to constitute non-resettlement."
Settlage, supra, at 86 (citing 8 C.F.R. 208.15 (a)-(b)(2008)). Depending on the
jurisdiction, some courts require a totality of the circumstances determination,
while other courts initially place the burden of proof on the government to prove
that an offer of resettlement was made, which once proven must be rebutted by the
applicant to prove that she was not firmly resettled. Settlage, supra, at 86 (citing
Camposeco-Montejo v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 814, 818-21 (9th Cir. 2004); Diallo v.
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Although immigration law in the United States is known for its
complex nature, individuals who seek refuge in the United States fall
within two simple categories: refugees and asylees.27 While both
refugees and asylees seek refuge in the United States from fear of
persecution in their native countries, the key difference between the
two is that refugees are people who seek refuge when they are
outside the United States, while asylees are already within the United
States when they seek asylum. 28 Nken was classified as an asylee, as
he was already living in the United States when he applied to be
granted refuge in the United States.29
In order to apply for refugee status, individuals must first be part
of the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). 30
Various agencies, including the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the U.S. Embassy, and other humanitarian
organizations, must refer these individuals to USRAP. 3 1 Applicants
next go through interviews, security checks, and must submit various
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2004); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477,
487-89 (3d Cir. 2001)). This second standard is used by the Asylum Officer Corps
Basic Training Course manual, which adds that an offer of resettlement or
permanent resident status is the primary consideration. Settlage, supra, at 86
(citing Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course,
Lesson: Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion at 26 (December 5, 2002),
available at http://www.rmscdenver.org/aobtc/Bars5decO2lplinks.pdf).
25. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2.
26. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
27. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 1. This distinction originated from the
Refugee Act of 1980. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 1.
29. See generally Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
30. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2.
31. Id. UNHCR is governed by 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention. Heidi H. Boas, The New Face
ofAmerica's Refugees: African Refugee Resettlement to the United States, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 431, 437 (2007). Its task is to organize worldwide refugee
resettlement and to refer groups to receiving countries, including the United States,
so that the refugees can be considered for resettlement. Id. Typically, UNHCR
refers individuals whose home countries are "no longer safe or practical for them to
remain." Id. It is within the President's power, after consulting Congress, to
determine which refugees to admit every year. Id. Therefore, UNHCR referrals
are not required, and refugee referrals from other organizations are also used in
deciding whether to admit an individual. See id.; see also Martin & Hoefer, supra
note 1, at 2.
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related documents so that U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services
(USCIS) can determine whether the applicant is eligible for
resettlement. 32 Then, the refugee is met at the airport by a sponsor
resettlement agency, which makes housing arrangements and
prepares a resettlement plan.33  Travel is arranged by the
International Organization for Migration (IOM). 34
To apply for asylee status, a person must be an "alien 3 5 present in
the United States or at a port of entry . . . regardless of his or her
immigration status."36 There are two paths for applying for
asylum.38  An individual can either apply affirmatively, through a
USCIS Asylum Officer, or defensively, "in removal proceedings
before an immigration judge of the Executive Office for the
Immigration Review (EOIR) of the Department of Justice." 39 The
Asylum Officer Corps adjudicates asylum claims that are filed with
the USCIS. 40 An Asylum Officer decides whether an applicant meets
the refugee definition and whether the applicant is barred for other
reasons. 4 1  Examples of circumstances barring applicants from
achieving asylee status include engaging in crimes or persecuting
others in the past, posing a threat to national security, or "firmly
resettling in another country before coming to the United States."42
32. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2.
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) defines an alien as "any person not a citizen or
national of the United States." Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.
2001).
36. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2.
37. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States: 2 Paths, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6
dla/?vgnextoid=e3f26138f898d01OVgnVCM10000048f3d6al RCRD&vgnextchan
nel=3a82ef4c766fd01 0VgnVCM1000000ecdl90aRCRD.
38. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 4.
3 9. Id
40. Id
4 1. Id
42. Id
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Both refugees and asylees are authorized to work in the United States
once they achieve their new legal status.43
B. Asylum Claim Appeal Process
In order to obtain asylum affirmatively in the United States, an
alien must be physically present in the United States at the time of
application." Every alien wishing to apply for affirmative asylum
must submit Form 1-589 (Application for Asylum and for
Withholding Removal) to USCIS. 4 5 Moreover, the alien must apply
within one year of his or her arrival, unless he can demonstrate that
the delay of filing is supported by a change in circumstances and the
application was filed within a reasonable amount of time.46 If the
alien's case is not approved, USCIS will issue a Form 1-862 (Notice
to Appear) and the case will be referred to the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR).47 A judge from EOIR will conduct a
hearing using the "de novo" standard and issue an independent
decision.4 8 However, if EOIR does not have jurisdiction, the Asylum
Office will issue Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge for an
asylum hearing, using Form 1-863.49 While the affirmative asylum
application is pending, aliens are permitted to remain within the
United States and are generally not detained by ICE while awaiting
43. Martin & Hoefer, supra note 1, at 2-4. Asylees and refugees are included
in a protected class, among U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents and
temporary residents and therefore possess "indefinite and unrestricted work
authorization for employment in the United States." Reginald C. Govan, Advanced
Corporate Compliance and Ethics Workshop 2009, 1776 PLI/Corp 433, 460
(2009).
44. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6
dla/?vgnextoid=dab9f067e318321OVgnVCM 1OOOOO82ca6aRCRD&vgnextchan
nel=f39d3e4d77d7321OVgnVCMl0000082ca6OaRCRD.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id.
4 8. Id.
49. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 44.
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an Immigration Judge's decision.50  Nevertheless, most asylum
applicants are not authorized to work at this time.5 '
In the present case, Nken applied for asylum withholding
removal-which is a defensive application for asylum-after his
affirmative asylum application was denied.52 In that case, an alien
must be involved in removal proceedings with the EOIR.53 There are
two paths to placing an alien in the defensive asylum process. 54 First,
if it is determined that the alien is ineligible for asylum, an alien may
be referred by a USCIS Immigration Judge. 5 Second, defensive
asylum may occur when an alien has been apprehended without
proper legal documents in the United States or if the alien was caught
attempting to enter the United States without proper identification
and an Asylum Officer finds the alien to have a "credible fear of
persecution or torture." 56 Defensive asylum cases are held before an
Immigration Judge in an adversarial proceeding, where both the
Government (represented by an ICE attorney) and the alien have the
opportunity to present their arguments.5 7  After the Immigration
Judge hears both sides, he decides if the alien is eligible for asylum
or not.5 An eligible alien obtains asylum status, but an Immigration
Judge may order an ineligible alien to be removed or, in some cases,
determine other forms of relief.59  Either party may appeal the
Immigration Judge's decision.60 Appellate administrative decisions
50. Id.
5 1. Id.
52. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754; Obtaining Asylum in the United States,
supra note 44.
53. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 44.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id.; see also Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screening, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6
dla/?vgnextoid=897f549bf068321OVgnVCM 1OOOOO82ca6aRCRD&vgnextchan
nel=f39d3e4d77d7321OVgnVCMIOOOOO82ca6OaRCRD.
57. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 44.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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are issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 6 1 These
decisions are binding on Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
officers and Immigration Judges. 62  Although the BIA is not
considered a federal court, its decisions may be reviewed by federal
courts. 63 The BIA mostly hears appeals regarding removal orders
and applications for relief from removal.M Finally, if the alien's
federal court of appeals appeal is denied, his last resort is the United
States Supreme Court.65
C. Changes to the Judicial Review Process
1. The Language of the INA and Automatic Stays Under Former §
1 105a 66
IRIRA was intended to repeal and amend numerous sections of
the INA, "including the provision on reinstatement of orders of
deportation for those who illegally reenter the United States."67
Specifically, subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA repeals subsection 242(f)(2)
of the INA.68 The section of the INA that directly precedes INA §
242(f)(2) states that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
61. BIA Decisions, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6
dla/?vgnextoid=f2c29c7755cb901OVgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD&vgnextchan
nel=f2c29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD.
62. Id
63. Id.; see also Joseph Rikhof, War Criminals Not Welcome; How Common
Law Countries Approach the Phenomenon Of International Crimes in the
Immigration and Refugee Context, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 453, 494 (2009).
64. Board of Immigration Appeals, United States Department of Justice,
available at www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm.
65. Carol M. Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora's Box: Innovative Techniques for
Effectively Counseling Asylum Applicants Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 235, 248 (2007).
66. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994). See also
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2009).
67. Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003); see IIRIRA § 305(a)(3)
(codified as amended at INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2002)) (replacing INA §
242(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)). The court in Arevalo notes that the above changes were
effective on April 1, 1997. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 4-5; see IIRIRA § 309(a).
68. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7.
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"to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [this
subchapter]."69
Moreover, prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, under former
section 1 105a,70 court of appeals judges did not have the authority to
review a deportation order for aliens who departed the United
States.71 Under this section, aliens were entitled to automatic stays of
removal until judicial review was finished.72 The purpose of former
section 1105a was to reduce judicial review of deportation orders for
aliens abusing the judicial system.7 3
69. Id. (citing INA § 242(f)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)) (2003)). The
significance in difference between the use of "restrain or enjoin" and merely the
term "enjoin" will be discussed throughout this note.
70. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994).
71. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1755. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994) ("An
order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court ... if [the
alien] has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order.").
72. Former section 1105a "provid[ed that] most aliens [were entitled to] ...
an automatic stay of their removal order while judicial review was pending." See
Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1755 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) ("The service of the
petition for review ... shall stay the deportation of the alien pending determination
of the petition by the court, unless the court otherwise directs"). See also Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1999).
Before enactment of IIRIRA, judicial review of most
administrative action under the INA was governed by 8 U.S.C. §
1105a, a special statutory-review provision directing that 'the
sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the judicial review of all
final orders of deportation' shall be that set forth in the Hobbs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq., which gives exclusive jurisdiction
to the courts of appeals.
Id.
73. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217, 224 (1963)
(citing Immigration and Nationality Act, § 106, as added by § 5(a) of Public Law
87-301, approved September 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 651, 8 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1962) §
1105a). The Supreme Court stated in this case that the purpose of the section was
"to abbreviate the process of judicial review of deportation orders in order to
frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of Congress, whereby
persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the
courts." Foti, 375 U.S. at 224. The Court explained that Congress "has been
disturbed in recent years to observe the growing frequency of judicial actions being
instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but which
are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or delaying indefinitely their
deportation from this country." Id. at 225.
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2. The New Test: IIRIRA 74
Nevertheless, when Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996, the Act
produced several important changes, not the least of which was the
repealing of section 1105 a.75 First, courts of appeals are permitted to
adjudicate a petition for review once an alien leaves the United
States.76 Second, subsection (b)(3)(B) of IIRIRA disposed of the
previous automatic stay presumption.77  The third relevant change
made by IIRIRA is under subsection (f)(2), which states that "no
court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order
under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a
matter of law."78
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005).
75. Reno, 525 U.S. at 475, 502 ("Congress passed IIRIRA which, inter alia,
repealed the old judicial-review scheme set forth in § 1 105a and instituted a new
(and significantly more restrictive) one in 8 U.S.C. § 1252.").
76. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1755 (citing IIRIRA § 360(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612)
(repealing § 1 105a). Under §306(b) of IIRIRA,
A petition for review filed under former section 106(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect before its repeal by
section 306(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1252 note)) shall be treated
as if it had been filed as a petition for review under section 242 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1252), as
amended by this section. 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (repealing §
1105a).
H.R. 1268, 109th Cong., Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252). See also Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1755.
77. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006) ("Service of the petition on
the officer or employee does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court's
decision on the petition, unless the court orders otherwise."). See also Nken, 129 S.
Ct. at 1755.
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA provides: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant
to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law."
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (f)(2).
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D. Competing Standards
The main issue in the Nken case is the determination of which
standard applies to a stay of removal.7 9 The Government argues that
the standard under subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA governs.so The
petitioner, Nken, claims that the "traditional" standard regarding
stays controls this case because subsection (f)(2) applies to
injunctions only." Therefore, it is important to discuss the difference
between the traditional test and the subsection (f)(2) standard.
1. The "Traditional Standard" for Stays
In general, when a petition for review is filed, no automatic stay
is permissible.82 Rather, an appellant, such as Nken, must make a
motion to obtain a stay pending adjudication so that the judgment or
order in question is not enforced immediately.83 "Different Rules of
Procedure govern the power of district courts and courts of appeals to
stay an order pending appeal." 84  Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 8(a), entitled "Motion for Stay," states that a "party must
ordinarily move first in the district court for . . . a stay of the
judgment."8 5 However, "[a] motion for the relief mentioned in Rule
8(a)(1) may be made to the court of appeals or to one of its judges." 86
Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 permits automatic
stays and grants the appellate court the power to stay proceedings. 87
79. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. John Y. Gotanda, The Emerging Standards for Issuing Appellate Stays, 45
BAYLOR L. REV. 809, 810 (1993) (citing FED. R. APP. P. 8).
83. Gotanda, supra note 82, at 810 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988), FED. R.
Civ. P. 62(g), FED. R. APP. P. 8).
84. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
85. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1).
86. FED. R. App. P. 8(b)(1). See also Gotanda, supra note 82, at 811 ("If... a
party can demonstrate that it is not practicable to seek relief before the lower
tribunal, an application for stay may be made directly to the court of appeals.").
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 62. This rule provides:
(a) Automatic Stay; Exceptions for Injunctions, Receiverships,
and Patent Accountings. Except as stated in this rule, no
30-1
Before IIRIRA, the governing standard for stays was under the
Hilton v. Braunskill Court,88 referred to as the "traditional" standard
for a stay.89 Under the "traditional" stay standard, a court should
consider four factors: "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
execution may issue on a judgment, nor may proceedings be
taken to enforce it, until 14 days have passed after its entry.
But unless the court orders otherwise, the following are not
stayed after being entered, even if an appeal is taken:
(1) an interlocutory or final judgment in an action for an
injunction or a receivership; or
(2) a judgment or order that directs an accounting in an action
for patent infringement.
(b) Stay Pending the Disposition of a Motion. On appropriate
terms for the opposing party's security, the court may stay the
execution of a judgment--or any proceedings to enforce it--
pending disposition of any of the following motions:
(1) under Rule 50, for judgment as a matter of law;
(2) under Rule 52(b), to amend the findings or for additional
findings;
(3) under Rule 59, for a new trial or to alter or amend a
judgment; or
(4) under Rule 60, for relief from a judgment or order.
(c) Injunction Pending an Appeal. While an appeal is pending
from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants,
dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend,
modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or
other terms that secure the opposing party's rights. If the
judgment appealed from is rendered by a statutory three-judge
district court, the order must be made either:
(1) by that court sitting in open session; or
(2) by the assent of all its judges, as evidenced by their
signatures.
(g) Appellate Court's Power Not Limited. This rule does not limit
the power of the appellate court or one of its judges or
justices:
(1) to stay proceedings--or suspend, modify, restore, or grant
an injunction--while an appeal is pending
FED. R. CIV. P. 62.
88. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
89. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756.
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issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." 90
2. "Clear and Convincing Evidence" Standard under Subsection
(f)(2)91
Under subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA ("subsection (f)(2)"), the
relevant standard for injunctions is the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard.9 2 Under this standard, an alien must demonstrate
that executing the order at issue is "prohibited as a matter of law" by
"clear and convincing evidence" in order for that order to be
"enjoin[ed]." 93 Hence, IIRIRA "substantially limited the availability
of judicial review and streamlined all challenges to a removal order
into a single proceeding: the petition for review." 94 The case at hand
discusses whether subsection (f)(2) pertains to stays as well as
injunctions or whether it only applies to injunctions. 95
E. Case Law: Jurisdictional Split in Courts ofAppeals
The key issue in the present case, as will be discussed in the
Analysis section of this note, is what standard applies to stays. 96 fn
determining which standard to apply to situations such as this one,
where a stay of removal is requested, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
were split until the outcome of the present case. Although some
circuits held that the term "enjoin" is used broadly to encompass a
"stay"-so that the lIRIRA standard applies both to stays and
injunctions-other circuits held that injunctions and stays are
90. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
91. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2005)
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2). By passing IIRIRA, Congress "repealed the
old judicial-review scheme set forth in [8 U.S.C.] § 1105a and instituted a new (and
significantly more restrictive) one in 8 U.S.C. § 1252."' Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1755
(citing Reno, 525 U.S. at 940).
94. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1755.
95. See generally id.
96. See infra notes 147-231 and accompanying text.
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separate and different, applying different standards to stays and
injunctions."
1. Cases Using A Broad Interpretation of Term "Enjoin"
The Court in the present case disagreed with Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits, which held that the term "injunction" in IIRIRA includes
"stays" and, therefore, the IIRIRA standard should pertain to cases
such as this one.
The Fourth Circuit held in Teshome-Gebreegziabher v. Mukasey
that subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA "employs the broad term 'enjoin,'
which plainly includes the narrower term 'stay."' 9 8 The court
reasoned that given that the term "enjoin" is not clearly defined in
IIRIRA, it is necessary to "accord the term its 'ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress
intended [it] to bear some different import."' 99 Turning to the
customary use of dictionaries to resolve such disputes, the court in
Teshome-Gebreegziabher followed with the pertinent definitions,
explaining that "enjoin" is requires a person "to perform, or to
abstain or desist from, some acts," while a "stay" is "a suspension of
the case or some designated proceedings within it. It is a kind of
injunction with which a court freezes its proceedings at a particular
point." 00 A comparison of these definitions results in a conclusion
that a stay is part of the broader category of injunctions. 101 The court
concluded the topic by stating that, "[w]e are hesitant to interpret a
statute so as to bolster our own power in the face of a deliberate
congressional allotment of authority to another branch."' 02
The Eleventh Circuit held that injunctions encompass stays and
therefore the subsection (f)(2) standard applies to the alien's stay of
removal motion.1 03  The court rejected the notion that the term
"enjoin" is "limited to permanent injunctive relief and cannot
97. See generally infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text.
98. Teshome-Gebreegziabher, 528 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2008).
99. Id. (citing DIRECTV, Inc. v. Nicholas, 403 F.3d 223, 225 (4th Cir.
2005)).
100. Teshome-Gebreegziabher, 528 F.3d at 333-34.
101. Id. at 334.
102. Id.
103. Weng v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 287 F.3d 1335, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2002).
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encompass temporary motions for stays" because the court held that
the plain meaning of the term "enjoin" did not support such an
interpretation.104 Moreover, the court contrasted subsection (f)(1) of
IIRIRA with subsection (f)(2), explaining that the first "prohibits the
use of injunctive relief against entire provisions of immigration law,"
while subsection (f)(2) deals only with enjoining in removal
situations.1 0 5  Hence, the court reasoned that the broad term
"restrain," which without argument in the court's view would include
both injunctions and stays, would not apply in subsection (f)(2) for
removal situations.106 This is because "injunctive relief grants the
very affirmative relief sought by aliens instead of merely preserving
the status quo."' The Eleventh Circuit ultimately stated that
"Congress chose the broad word 'enjoin' in § 1252(f)(2) against a
specific and consistent backdrop of case law-both generally and in
immigration law-interpreting stays as injunctive relief and did not
exclude them or include any limiting language in § 1252(f)(2)."1 08
2. Cases Using A Broad Interpretation of Term "Enjoin"
The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
disagreed with the reasoning of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits and
held in contrast that subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA does not pertain to
stays. The First Circuit began its inquiry by looking to the language
of the statutes at issue, contrasting the INA § 242(f)(2), which grants
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court "to enjoin or restrain the operation
of the provisions of [this subchapter]," with IIRIRA's subsection
(f)(2) which utilizes the term "enjoin" alone. 109 The court reasoned
that this "linguistic shift" suggests that Congress's intent was to give
separate meanings to the terms "enjoin" and "stay."" 0 Thus, this
court concluded that the "most sensible way to give operative effect
to both words in this statutory scheme is to treat the word 'enjoin' as
104. Id. at 1339.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Weng, 287 F.3d at 1339.
109. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7 (citing INA § 242(f)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1))
(2003)).
110. Arevalo, 344 F.3d at 7.
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referring to permanent injunctions and the word 'restrain' as referring
to temporary injunctive relief (such as a stay).""'
The Second Circuit used similar reasoning in Mohammed v.
Reno, emphasizing the change from using "enjoin or restrain" in the
INA subsection 242(f)(1) and merely "enjoin" in IIRIRA's
subsection (f)(2).11 2  The Third Circuit cited Mohammed in
supporting its logic that subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA did not apply
and that, therefore, the "traditional" test would apply to a case
involving a stay of removal.' 13 The Fifth Circuit cited circuits on
both sides of the issue, but ultimately held that because subsection
(b)(3)(B) of IIRIRA, which discusses stays, does not mention the
standard from subsection (f)(2), Congress intended to use the distinct
terms "stay" and "enjoin" for these sections because subsection (f)(2)
was not intended to embrace stays.' 14 The Sixth Circuit sided with
the same reasoning, and refused to apply IIRIRA's subsection (f)(2)
standard to a stay of removal. 15 The Seventh Circuit admitted that
despite a "functional overlap" between stays and injunctions, the
"words nonetheless cover different domains."' 16 The Seventh Circuit
cryptically offered the following explanation:
Perhaps the distinction between injunctions and stays
rests more on history than on function-especially
when the stay's addressee is an agency rather than
another judge. Still, it is a long-standing distinction,
111. Id. (citing similar reasoning in the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a)-(b)).
112. Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
113. Douglas v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2004).
114. Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 169, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2005).
115. Bejjani v. I.N.S., 271 F.3d 670, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2001).
116. Hor v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2005). More specifically,
an:
'injunction' is an order issued as the relief in independent
litigation, while a 'stay' is an order integral to a system of
judicial review: an appellate court may stay a district judge's
order, or its own mandate, or an agency's decision when the
agency plays the role of the district court and the initial judicial
tribunal is a court of appeals.
Id.
Spring 2010 The Supreme Court's Take on Immigration 201
202 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
reflected not only in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 but also in Fed.
R. App. P. 18 and 28 U.S.C. § 2349, which govern the
issuance of 'stays' pending appellate review of federal
agencies' decisions.'"7
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the previously stated
reasoning, beginning its analysis in Andreiu v. Ashcroft by stating:
"[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion."" 8 The court reminds us that
because the statute preceding IIRRA subsection (f)(2) used the term
"enjoin or restrain," Congress did not view the terms as
synonymous.1 9 Therefore, "or restrain" would be "mere surplusage"
if the term "enjoin" was originally intended to "cover the entire
universe of judicial power over immigration proceedings." 20 The
Ninth Circuit next discussed the separate mention of stays in
subsection (b)(3)(B), which the court found to be a compelling
suggestion of Congress's intent to separate stays from injunctions.'21
Next, the court pointed to the heading of subsection (f)(2), which is
entitled "[1]imit on injunctive relief," rather than a more broad term
such as "enjoin or restrain."1 22 Ultimately, the court suggested that
when Congress had already discussed stays separately from
injunctions, Congress knew when it was necessary to use the term
"stay."' 23  Hence, the Ninth Circuit ended its discussion by stating
that subsection (f)(2) does not limit judicial power to stay deportation
117. Id.
118. Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)).
119. Andreiu, 253 at 480.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 480-81. The court adds that the most logical setting to discuss
limiting judicial authority in terms of staying deportation or removal orders
pending adjudication would have been under subsection (b)(3)(B), which
specifically discusses stays. Id. at 481.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 482 ("Congress knew very well how to use the term 'stay' when it
wanted to, and it is not plausible that here, and only here, Congress meant 'enjoin'
to include the entire universe of court actions that have a prohibiting or restraining
effect.").
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orders pending review, that such an argument is contrary to logic and
justice, citing a judge's words from a previous dissent regarding the
same immigrant to support its point.124
III. FACTS
In April 2001, Cameroon citizen Jean Mark Nken entered the
United States with a transit visa. 125  He applied for asylum in
December 2001 under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, to withhold removal under §
1231(b)(3), and to defer removal under the Convention Against
124. The court states:
To hold otherwise, as Judge [Sidney] Thomas noted, would mean
that 'thousands of asylum seekers who fled their native lands
based on well-founded fears of persecution will be forced to
return to that danger under the fiction that they will be safe while
waiting the slow wheels of American justice to grind to a halt.'
Id. at 484. (citing Andreiu v. Reno, 223 F.3d 1111, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
125. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754. Transit visas are granted to aliens who come to
the United States in transit to other countries or to the United States under section
101(a)(15)(C) of INA. Steven C. Bell, PLI Continuing Legal Assistant Training
(R) Workshop for Legal Assistants 1994: Basic Immigration Procedures, 500
PLI/LIT 43, 55 (1994) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C)). This section, which
grants non-immigrant status to aliens, is divided into three parts. Bell, supra, at 55.
Under subcategory C-1, "alien[s] in immediate and continuous transit through the
United States" are granted a transit visa if they have a ticket or "assurance of
transportation" to their final destination, have "sufficient funds" for their travels, or
have permission to enter the destination. Id. at 55-56. C-2 is reserved for aliens
desiring to enter the United Nations on official business, defined within a twenty-
five mile radius of New York City's Columbus Circle. Id. at 56. Finally,
subcategory C-3 is for government officials from foreign countries wishing to pass
through the United States on their way to another country. Id. Aliens must apply
for transit visas at a U.S. consulate using State Department Form OF-156, although
foreign government officials generally require a "note" from their country's foreign
office. Id. Typically, category C aliens may stay in the United States up to twenty-
nine days. Id. at 56-57 (citing C.F.R. § 214.2(c)(3) (1992)). Moreover, aliens
entering the United States under a transit visa may not change their non-immigrant
category upon arriving in the United States. Bell, supra, at 57. However, aliens
are sometimes granted permanent resident status under § 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255. Id. This is unlikely, however, because an alien attempting to change their
status in this manner must "overcome the suspicion that he or she had the
preconceived intent to seek permanent residence upon admission in C status." Id.
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Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.126  He claimed that he was being persecuted for
protesting against the government of Cameroon, and that if he
returned to Cameroon he would be subjected to further
persecution.' 2 7
According to Nken's application, he was persecuted after
participating in student protests against his government in 1990
(before he left to study in Cote D'Ivoire).12 8 Nken stated that upon
returning to Cameroon in 2000, he was imprisoned and beaten
because of his involvement in the protests.129 He was released after
30 days, and left Cameroon soon thereafter. 30 Upon his release
Nken visited the Bahamas for a medical conference.' 3 1 Two months
later, on his way back to Cameroon, he entered the United States and
chose to remain instead of returning to Cameroon.132
126. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754; see also Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), art. 3, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 100-20, p. 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2008). CAT,
which was ratified in 1990, "provides a federal cause of action for damages
'against any individual who, under actual or apparent authority or under color of
law of any foreign nations, subjects any individual to torture or extrajudicial
killing."' Pamela Stephens, Applying Human Rights Norms to Climate Change:
the Elusive Remedy, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49, 83 n.125 (2010)
(citing Pamela J. Stephens, Beyond Torture: Enforcing International Human Rights
in Federal Courts, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV 941, 953 (2001). Before having a
legitimate CAT cause of action, claimants must first exhaust their remedies "in the
place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred." Stephens, supra, at
82 n.125.
127. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754. See also Cameroon Country Profile, BBC,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiafrica/country_profiles/1042937.stm#media.
128. See also Nken v. Mukasey (08-681), Cornell University Law School, LII
Legal Information Institute, LIIBULLETIN, available at
http://topics.law.cornell.edulsupct/cert/08-68 1.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Brief for the Respondent at 4, Nken,129 S.Ct.1749 (No. 08-681).
132. Id; see also Nken v. Mukasey (08-681), Cornell University Law School,
LII Legal Information Institute, LIIBULLETIN, available at
http://topics.law.comell.edu/supct/cert/08-68 1.
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After applying for asylum, Nken was first denied relief by an
Immigration Judge who concluded that Nken was not credible.133
After Nken appealed the Immigration Judge's decision, the BIA
affirmed.134  The BIA declined to remand his application for
adjustment of status, notwithstanding the fact that Nken married an
American citizen, which sometimes changes an alien's chances of
obtaining asylum.' 35  Nken married U.S. citizen Brigitte Beloeck on
November 4, 2004, and "filed an 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative on
November 17, 2004, seeking lawful resident status for Nken on the
basis of his lawful marriage to a U.S. citizen." 36 After his motion to
133. See id. "Finding that documents Nken submitted to prove the risk he
would face upon returning to Cameroon were not authenticated and only worth "de
minimus weight." Id. Numerous discrepancies existed and the Immigration Judge
found the story to be "vague and improbable." Id.
134. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
135. See also Nken v. Mukasey (08-681), Cornell University Law School, LII
Legal Information Institute, LIIBULLETIN, available at
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-68 1.
136. Nken v. Mukasey (08-681), Cornell University Law School, LII Legal
Information Institute, LIIBULLETIN, available at
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-68 1. Although non-citizens are
sometimes granted residency and U.S. citizenship upon marrying an American, as
Nken did in the present case, this is not automatic. The requirements for obtaining
permanent residency status for aliens who are spouses of U.S. citizens are
enumerated under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, an alien spouse ... shall be
considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, to have obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to
the provisions of this section." 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1). However, 8 U.S.C. §
1186a(b)(1) touches on when an alien's permanent resident status terminates,
stating:
In the case of an alien with permanent resident status on a
conditional basis under subsection (a) of this section, if the
Attorney General determines, before the second anniversary of
the alien's obtaining the status of lawful admission for permanent
residence, that--
(A) the qualifying marriage--
(i) was entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien's
admission as an immigrant, or
(ii) has been judicially annulled or terminated, other than
through the death of a spouse; or
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reopen the matter was denied, "Nken filed a petition for review of the
BIA's removal order in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,"
which was denied.137 He next filed a second motion to reopen, and a
second petition for review, which were both denied.138
Nken subsequently filed for a third motion to reopen, stating that
circumstances had changed in Cameroon making his persecution
there more likely.'39 This was denied because the BIA found that
Nken did not present "sufficient facts or evidence of changed country
(B) a fee or other consideration was given (other than a fee or
other consideration to an attorney for assistance in preparation
of a lawful petition) for the filing of a petition under section
1154(a) of this title or subsection (d) or (p) of section 1184 of
this title with respect to the alien;
the Attorney General shall so notify the parties involved and,
subject to paragraph (2), shall terminate the permanent
resident status of the alien (or aliens) involved as of the date
of the determination.
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1).
Moreover, "noncitizens whose permanent residence status arises from their
marriage to a U.S. citizen are subject to a two-year period of conditional
residency." Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1683,
1741 n.103 (2009) (citing INA § 216(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)). After the
two-year period is over, "the noncitizen is removable unless she files jointly with
her spouse a petition to remove the conditional aspect of her residency and
successfully passes an interview with an immigration officer." Stumpf, supra, at
1741 n. 103 (citing INA § 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)). However, the alien
may waive the joint filing requirement if he can demonstrate:
(a) that deportation would cause extreme hardship due to factors
arising only within the two-year conditional period; (b) that she
entered into the marriage in good faith but it was either
terminated (except by death of her spouse) or her spouse battered
her or her child or subjected her or her child to extreme cruelty;
and (c) she was not at fault in failing to file jointly.
Stumpf, supra, at 1741 n. 103 (citing INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)).
Although the Court does not discuss the reasoning behind not granting permanent
residency status to Nken after his marriage to an American woman, it is likely he
did not qualify as a result of the statutes discussed in this footnote.
137. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
138. Id
139. Id.
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conditions."' 40 Nken sought review of this decision in the Court of
Appeals and "moved to stay his deportation pending resolution of his
appeal."l 4 1 Nken conceded that the standard governing an alien's
attempt to stay a removal order in the Fourth Circuit "required . .. an
alien . . . to show by 'clear and convincing evidence' that the order
was 'prohibited as a matter of law,"' under subsection (f)(2) of
IIRIRA.142  However, Nken argued that this standard did not
govern.143 "The Court of Appeals denied Nken's motion without
comment."144 Nken applied to the United States Supreme Court for a
stay of removal pending review, "ask[ing] in the alternative that [the
Supreme Court] grant certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of
Appeals on what standards governs a request for such a stay." 4 5 The
Supreme Court, in Nken v. Mukasey, granted certiorari and stayed
Nken's removal pending a further order by the Court.14 6
IV. ANALYSIS OF COURT'S OPINION
A. ChiefJustice Roberts's Majority Opinion 47
Beginning his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts immediately
highlights the importance of time in the appeals process.148  He
reminds his reader that, in considering appeals, "[n]o court can make
time stand still."' 49 Nevertheless, Justice Roberts adds that a party
might suffer harm if the court takes the time necessary to make an
140. Id
141. Id
142. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id at 1755.
146. Id
147. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1753-54. The Court's majority opinion is authored
by Justice Roberts, and joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer. Id.
148. Id. at 1754. "It takes time to decide a case on appeal. Sometimes a little;
sometimes a lot." Id.
149. Id. (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9 (1942)).
The Supreme Court's Take on Immtigration 207Spring 2010
208 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
informed decision, but the decision comes too late.'5 0 The majority
frames the solution by revealing the traditional reasoning behind a
stay:'"' to give appellate courts sufficient time to review a case by
putting enforcement of the action at issue on hold until the appeal is
complete.' 52
The Court identifies the issue of the case as whether the standard
for appellate review is controlled by "a statutory provision that
sharply restricts the circumstances under which a court may issue an
injunction blocking the removal of an alien from this country" or
whether traditional stay rules apply.' 53 The majority holds that stays
are controlled by the traditional test, which necessitates vacating and
remanding the case to adhere to this ruling.' 54 The Court sets forth a
short statement of the facts in Part One.' 55 Part Two of the opinion
presents the statute at issue, subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA, and its
effect on the traditional automatic stay rights of aliens, that existed
before IIRIRA was established, while their cases awaited judicial
review.156
In Part Three of the opinion, the Court states the parties'
opposing viewpoints on the governing standard.' 57  Justice Roberts
150. "No court can make time stand still" while it considers an appeal ... and
if a court takes the time it needs, the court's decision may in some cases come too
late for the party seeking review." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754.
151. "That is why it 'has always been held, . . . that as part of its traditional
equipment for the administration of justice, a federal court can stay the
enforcement of a judgment pending the outcome of an appeal."' Id. (citing
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., 316 U.S. at 9-10).
152. "A stay does not make time stand still, but does hold a ruling in abeyance
to allow an appellate court the time necessary to review it." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at
1754. In other words, the reasoning is that a stay should be granted to provide
appellate courts with sufficient time to decide a case on the merits, rather than
rushing its a decision.
153. Id. By using this language, the Court first suggests that a key distinction
exists between an injunction and a stay.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1754-55.
156. Id. at 1755-56.
157. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756. Nken contends that the "traditional" standard
applies, Id. (citing Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776). The Government disputes this
argument, asserting that a stay is merely a type of injunction- or that the relief
sought is injunctive in nature- and therefore subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA applies to
the case at hand. Id.
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concludes that the traditional stay factors apply after interpreting the
language, specific context, and broad context of IIRIRA.'5  In
Subpart A, the majority describes the traditional inherency and
importance of the appellate court's power to stay an order.' 59
However, the section reminds the reader that despite this strong
tradition, a stay is not a right, as it encroaches on everyday judicial
review practices, 160 and because the public is entitled to orders being
carried out without delay.1 6 1
In Subpart B of Part Three, Chief Justice Roberts contrasts the
meaning of the term "enjoin" in subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA with the
term "stay."l62 The Court notes that, "an injunction 163 and a stayl 64
158. Id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (holding
that statutory interpretation rests on "the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.")).
159. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756-57. The Court states that, "[a]n appellate
court's power to hold an order in abeyance while it assesses the legality of the
order has been described as 'inherent,' preserved in the grant of authority to federal
courts to 'issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions."' Id. at 1756 (citing All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2007)).
Moreover, the Court cites Scripps-Howard, which held that despite Congress's
failure to expressly bestow the power of appellate review in a statute, the statute
should not be interpreted as absolutely denying that power. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at
1756 (citing Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 4). The majority points to the fact that
the Scripps-Howard Court neither decided what "criteria" should control the
court's power of stay, nor the conditions for Congress to deny that power. Nken,
129 S. Ct. at 1757 (citing Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 17). Instead, the Court in
Scripps-Howard described the appellate court's "power to grant a stay pending
review . . . as part of a court's 'traditional equipment for the administration of
justice."' Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757 (citing Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 9-10).
Furthermore, the Court stresses that this authority to grant a stay is "firmly
imbedded in our judicial system," "consonant with the historic procedures of
federal appellate courts," and "a power as old as the judicial system of the nation."
Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757 (citing Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 13, 17). Therefore,
before delving into an analysis of IIRIRA's authority over stays, the Court
expounds the strong tradition that gives weight to the appellate court's power to
grant a stay. See id.
160. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757. Even if irreparable damage results in the
absence of a stay, a stay "is not a matter of right." Id. (citing Virginian R. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 658 (1926)).
161. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757.
162. Id. at 1757-60. The majority explains that because subsection (0(2) does
not use the word "stay," the parties disagree about whether a stay is a type of
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have typically been understood to serve different purposes."l 6 5 The
majority admits to some "overlap" existing between a stay and an
injunction,166 mainly because both stop a specific action from
occurring before "that action has been conclusively determined."' 6 1
Nevertheless, the Court points out that the key difference between a
stay and an injunction is that an "alien seeking a stay of removal
pending adjudication of a petition for review does not ask for a
coercive order against the Government, but rather for the temporary
setting aside of the source of the Government's authority to
remove."' 6 8  Explaining that the stay sought by an alien is not
injunction and therefore included within the scope of IIRIRA, or whether a stay
serves a distinct purpose from an injunction. Id. at 1757.
163. Id. The Court explains that an injunction is a court order that forbids
someone from engaging in a specific act, or a way a court can tell someone to stop
or do something specific. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305
(1982) (holding that an injunction "directs the conduct of a party, and does so with
the backing of its full coercive powers"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed.
1990)). Moreover, an injunction is as "every order of the court which commands or
forbids," but also as "a judicial process or mandate operating in personam." Nken,
129 S. Ct. at 1757 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8th ed. 2004)).
Therefore, the Court concludes that an injunction is directed towards a party and
applies to the party's conduct, whether it is a preliminary or final injunction. Nken,
129 S. Ct. at 1757.
164. The majority states that a stay controls a judicial proceeding, rather than
a specific party's action. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1758. Consequently, a stay halts or
postpones a proceeding, or temporarily divests the enforceability of an order. Id.
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a stay as "a
suspension of the case or some designated proceedings within it.")).
165. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757. Moreover, a key distinction is that a stay
"simply suspend~s] judicial alteration of the status quo," but an injunction "grants
judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts." Id. at 1758 (citing
Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986)
(Scalia, J., in chambers)). The Court cites other instances where a stay was
differentiated from an injunction: "applicants are seeking not merely a stay of a
lower court judgment, but an injunction against the enforcement of a presumptively
valid state statute." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1758 (citing Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S.
1301, 1303 (2001) (Renquist, C.J., in chambers)).
166. The Court adds that overlap exists particularly between a preliminary
injunction and a stay. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1758.
167. Id
168. Id.
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generally known as an injunction,169 Justice Roberts adds some
poetic rhetoric to illustrate his point: "[t]he sun may be a star, but
'starry sky' does not refer to a bright summer day. The terminology
of subsection (f)(2) does not comfortably cover stays." 7 0
Next, the Court turns to "Congress's structural choices" in
discussing stays separately from injunctions.17 1 Justice Roberts
makes the case that when Congress wished to discuss stays in
IIRIRA, it specified its intent by using the term stay rather than
discussing injunctions and enjoining removal.172  He points to the
Court's former decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,173 which held
that the Court typically presumes that Congress intentionally includes
or excludes certain language or terms.174  Moreover, the Court
challenges the Government's argument that the majority's position
fails to account for a practical effect of subsection (f)(2)17 5 by
169. A stay that relates to the progress of litigation is typically not deemed an
injunction. Id. (citing Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.
271, 279 (1988); FED. RULE APP. PROC. 8(a)(1)(A) (noting that temporary relief
from a lower court's judgment while awaiting appeal is considered a stay)).
170. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1759.
17 1. Id.
172. Id. The Court uses subsection (b)(3)(B) of IIRIRA to illustrate this point,
pointing to the specific use of the term "stay:" "service of a petition for review
'does not stay the removal of an alien pending the court's decision on the petition,
unless the court orders otherwise."' Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B)).
Correspondingly, the heading of subsection (b)(3)(B) is "Stay of order." Nken, 129
S. Ct. at 1759 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B)). The majority contrasts this
subsection, with subsection (f)(2) at issue in this case, which omitted the word
"stay," and used the heading "Limit on injunctive relief' instead. Nken, 129 S. Ct.
at 1759 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2005)). The section uses the words "enjoin
the removal of any alien." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1759.
173. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
174. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1759 (citing INS, 480 U.S. at 423 ("[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.")). Justice Roberts explains
that this applies more than ever to the interpretation of the statute at hand because
subsections (b)(3)(B) and (f)(2) were enacted "as part of a unified overhaul of
judicial review procedures." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1759. The majority justifies this
by explaining that subsection (b)(3)(B) would have been the logical place to
include an amendment regarding the traditional standard of granting stays. Id.
175. Id. The majority adds that it is "one thing to propose that 'enjoin' in
subsection (f)(2) covers a broad spectrum of court orders . . . [but] another to
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deducing that Congress either included subsection (f)(2) because of
its concern about injunctions of the INA provisions by courts, or that
the subsection was included as a catchall to exclude injunctions.176
The Court ends this discussion by noting that the Government's point
is not sufficiently strong to outweigh the Court's reasoning that
subsection (f)(2) does not apply to stays. 17 7
In Subpart C of Part Three, the majority discusses the historical
and practical incorrectness of applying the subsection (f)(2) standard
to stays.17 8 Historically, Justice Roberts explains, allowing courts to
grant stays has been justified by a "need 'to prevent irreparable injury
to the parties or to the public' pending review." 79  However, the
Court maintains that the higher standard of subsection (f)(2), which
requires a decision on the merits, does not permit the Court to
consider irreparable harm, potentially caused by time limitations or
delays.o80 In the majority's view, using the subsection (f)(2) standard
to decide whether a stay may be granted "results in something that
does not remotely look like a stay.""' The Court concludes Part
Three by reiterating that Congress would not "without clearly
expressing such a purpose, deprive the Court of Appeals of its
suggest that Congress used 'enjoin' to refer exclusively to stays, so that a failure to
include stays in subsection (f)(2) would render the provision superfluous" because
the terms are not synonymous. Id.
176. Id. at 1759-60 (citing Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312).
177. Id. at 1760.
178. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1760. First, the Court notes that the reason behind a
stay pending appeal is to suspend the matter temporarily to give the court sufficient
time to decide on the merits. Id. However, under subsection (f)(2), for a stay to be
granted, an appellate court must first decide on the merits under the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard. Id. The Court reasons that if this were the correct
purpose of subsection (f)(2), it would invert the traditional function of a stay
because it would "requir[e] a definitive merits decision earlier rather than later."
Id.
179. Id (citing Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 9).
180. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1760. The Court adds that, "[s]ubsection (f)(2) does
not resolve the dilemma stays historically addressed: what to do when there is
insufficient time to resolve the merits and irreparable harm may result from delay."
Id.
181. Id
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customary power to stay orders under review."l 82 Therefore, Justice
Roberts agrees with Nken that the subsection (f)(2) standard does not
apply when an alien asks an appellate court to "stay removal pending
judicial review."' 83
Part Four of the majority's opinion asks which standard does
apply, if it is not that of subsection (f)(2).184 The Court begins its
query by explaining that, "[a] stay is not a matter of right, even if
irreparable injury might otherwise result."ss Rather, it depends on
the circumstances and is monitored by judicial discretion.' 86  The
standard governing the Court's exercise of discretion is reflected in
the traditional four factors seen in Hilton test.'8 7 Yet, Justice Roberts
admits that there is "substantial overlap between these and the factors
governing preliminary injunctions." Justice Roberts gives the first
two factors 8 9 the most weight, noting that "[m]ore than a mere
'possibility' of relief is required" for the first factor,' 90 and that
removal for aliens is not "categorically irreparable," and therefore
182. Id. (citing Scripps-Howard, 316 U.S. at 11). Justice Roberts further
repeats that subsection (f)(2) would strip courts of their "customary" authority to
grant stays. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1760.
183. Id.
184. Id. The Court explains that the parties disagree about whether the
"traditional" standard governing stays applies, or whether the stay test must be
reformulated, as the Government argues.
185. Id. (citing Virginian Ry. Co., 272 U.S. at 672).
186. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1760-61; see also Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777.
Furthermore, the burden is on the party calling for the stay to prove that an exercise
of judicial discretion is validated by the circumstances. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761;
see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997); Landis v. North American
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936).
187. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (citing Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776).
188. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761 (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376-77 (2008)). The Court adds that these factors are
not the same, but the majority touch on related concerns when dealing with courts
preventing actions before a final decision has been reached. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at
1761.
189. These first two factors are: "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a
strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant
will be irreparably injured absent a stay." Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
190. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761.
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more is required to prove the second factor.' Upon satisfying these
two factors under the traditional stay test, the court must weigh the
harm to the opposing party and the public interest, factors that merge
when the opposing side is the Government.192  Ultimately, the
majority holds that appellate courts must not presume that these
interests weigh in the appellant's favor, and must analyze these
factors individually to reach its conclusion. 193
The Court asserts that the Court of Appeals did not specify which
standard was used when denying Nken's stay of removal, although
use of the subsection (f)(2) standard was the precedent.194 Because
this Court decided that the subsection (f)(2) standard does not apply
to stays, the majority vacated and remanded the lower court's
decision under the traditional stay standard in this opinion. 9
191. Id. The Court holds that some courts erred in its analysis regarding
removal, because it is not per se irreparable. Id.; see e.g., Ofosu v. McElroy, 98
F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 1996). Although the automatic stay that existed before the
enactment of IIRIRA acknowledged that removal before an appellate court decision
was irreparable, with the enactment of IIRIRA, automatic stays were abolished.
Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761. Therefore, subsection (b)(3)(B) got rid of the reason for
categorical stays because it permits "prosecution of a petition after removal." Id.
The Court notes that this confirms the notion that removal does not in and of itself
constitute irreparable injury because aliens can still pursue their petitions despite
being successfully removed. Id. Furthermore, the majority adds that effective
relief can be provided to those who prevail on their petitions for review. Id.
192. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1762. The Court admits that the public interest is not
entirely that of the Government, acknowledging that additional public interests
exist. Id. First, there is the interest of "preventing aliens from being wrongfully
removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm,"
which, however, is not a reason to instantly grant a stay. Id. Secondly, there is a
public interest in carrying out removal orders promptly, because when an alien is
deemed lawfully removable, the alien's presence in this country violates United
States law. Id. (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471 (1999)). Finally, the Court adds that there may be a public interest in
removing an alien whose presence is dangerous for the United States or who has
abused of the legal system. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1762.
193. Id.
194. Id
195. Id
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Therefore, Nken's stay of removal motion will be considered under
the traditional standard, rather than the subsection (f)(2) standard. 196
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinionl9 7
Justice Kennedy begins his concurrence by reiterating the
majority's assertion that "[a] stay of removal is an extraordinary
remedy that should not be granted in the ordinary case, much less
awarded as of right." 98 However, the concurring opinion differs
from the majority most significantly in its interest in more "empirical
data on the number of stays granted, the correlation between stays
granted and ultimate success on the merits, or similar matters." 99
Justice Kennedy's reasoning in aspiring to less stays of removal
being granted hinges on the sheer numbers of immigration petitions
filed in the United States.200  In order to decrease the number of
immigrants' petitions, Justice Kennedy wants the granting of stays to
be made more difficult, he notes that four-factor inquiry under the
traditional standard must be "particularized," and there must be more
than "mere removal" in order for a stay to be warranted. 20 1 The
concurring opinion concludes on the note that the stay applicant bears
a heavy burden of proving that error on the merits occurred in the
196. Id. As a result of the Supreme Court ruling, the present case was
remanded, and the Fourth Circuit then vacated and remanded the case in Nken v.
Holder, 585 F.3d 818, 823 (4th Cir. 2009).
197. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is joined by Justice Scalia. Nken,
129 S. Ct. at 1762-64.
198. Justice Kennedy even uses the same case as used by the majority to
support its contention. Id. at 1762 (citing Virginian Ry. Co., 272 U.S. at 672-73).
199. Id. Justice Kennedy explains that obtaining such statistics would be
beneficial in determining whether the decision in the present case produces a "fair
and effective result" and so that Congress can ascertain that the purposes of its
statute are being achieved. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1762-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 1763. For instance, Justice Kennedy shows concern that over half
of all American immigration petitions are considered by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id. He adds that "courts should not grant stays of removal on a routine
basis." Id. He explains that the danger of irreparable harm resulting from removal
is reduced by IIRIRA, which now permits aliens who leave the country to seek
review, something that aliens did not have the ability to do previously. Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1994).
201. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1763 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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district court's judgment as well as irreparable injury inevitably
suffered by the applicant in the absence of a stay.202
C. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion2 03
Justice Alito begins his dissent with strong sentiment: "The
Court's decision nullifies an important statutory provision that
Congress enacted when it reformed the immigration laws in 1996. I
would give effect to that provision . . . "204 In Part One of his dissent,
Justice Alito describes the process for an alien when first charged
with being "removable" from the United States, and explains that
removal orders are not governed by "judicial enforcement." 205  The
dissent's analysis differs from that of the majority because Justice
Alito states that the alien may request a stay from the Executive
Branch.206 Therefore, he notes that an alien "wants a court to restrain
202. Id. (citing Williams v. Zbaraz, 442 U.S. 1309, 1311 (1979)).
203. The dissent is presented by Justice Alito, and is joined by Justice
Thomas. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1764-69.
204. Id. at 1764.
205. Id. The dissent explains that, first, an immigration judge decides whether
the alien must be removed, and then the alien may appeal that order before the
Board of Immigration Appeals. Id (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(47)(B) (2009),
1229a(a) (2006; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1(a)(1)(i), (c), 1241.1, 1241.31 (2008)). He
declares that an order is final when the appeal is unsuccessful and therefore it may
be executed at any time. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1764-69 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 8
U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)(2006), 1252(b)(8)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.33
(2005)). Therefore, he states that orders for removal "are self-executing orders, not
dependent upon judicial enforcement." Aken, 129 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 398 (1995)).
206. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§
241.6(a)-(b), 1241(a)-(b)(2005). The Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)
provides:
Any request of an alien under a final order of deportation or
removal for a stay of deportation or removal shall be filed on
Form 1-246, Stay of Removal, with the district director having
jurisdiction over the place where the alien is at the time of filing.
The Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Executive Associate
Commissioner for Field Operations, Deputy Executive Associate
Commissioner for Detention and Removal, the Director of the
Office of Juvenile Affairs, regional directors, or district director,
in his or her discretion and in consideration of factors listed in 8
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the Executive from executing a final and enforceable removal
order[;] the alien must seek an injunction to do so." 207  Hence, the
dissent reasons that the "plain text" of IRIRA applies to this
injunction.2 08
CFR 212.5 and section 241(c) of the Act, may grant a stay of
removal or deportation for such time and under such conditions
as he or she may deem appropriate. Neither the request nor
failure to receive notice of disposition of the request shall delay
removal or relieve the alien from strict compliance with any
outstanding notice to surrender for deportation or removal.
8 C.F.R. § 241.6(a) (2005). Therefore, when an alien seeks to stay an order of
removal, the parties listed above, and not the court of appeals decide whether to
grant a stay. See generally id.
However, subsection (b) also provides that:
Denial by the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Executive
Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, Deputy Executive
Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, Director of
the Office of Juvenile Affairs, regional director, or district
director of a request for a stay is not appealable, but such denial
shall not preclude an immigration judge or the Board from
granting a stay in connection with a previously filed motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider as provided in 8 CFR part 3.
8 C.F.R. § 241.6(b) (2005). Although the Commissioner's denial of a stay is not
appealable, an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals may grant a
stay for a previous motion to reopen or reconsider. See generally id. Therefore,
the court system has a separate power to grant a stay.
Finally, section 241.6(c) provides that:
The Service shall take all reasonable steps to comply with a stay
granted by an immigration judge or the Board. However, such a
stay shall cease to have effect if granted (or communicated) after
the alien has been placed aboard an aircraft or other conveyance
for removal and the normal boarding has been completed.
8 C.F.R. § 241.6(c). Therefore, the fact that the "Executive Branch" described by
Justice Alito may grant a stay of removal does not exclude the courts from having
discretion in granting stays.
207. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("making a final order of
removal subject to 28 U.S.C. §2349(b), which provides that an 'interlocutory
injunction' can 'restrain' the 'execution of a final order") (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a) (2005)).
208. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Part Two of the dissent is broken into three subparts. Justice
Alito notes in Subpart A that it is undisputed that Nken is
"remova[ble] ... pursuant to a final order." 209 In Subpart B, Justice
Alito opens with the focal question of whether relief sought by Nken
was an "order enjoin[ing] his removal." 2 10 The dissent discusses the
ordinary use of the word "enjoin" and applies the definition to the
order sought by Nken in this case. 2 11 Upon this application, Justice
Alito finds the majority's conclusion, that the present case involves a
stay rather than an injunction, to be erroneous for three reasons.2 12
The first reason given by Justice Alito is that a stay is merely a type
of injunction.2 13  Moreover, the dissent demonstrates examples of
statutes and judicial decisions where the word "injunction" was used
209. Id. at 1764-65.
210. Id. at 1765.
211. Id. Justice Alito defines the term "enjoin" as "to 'require,"command,' or
'direct' an action, or to 'require a person . . . to perform, or to abstain or desist
from, some act."' Id. (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 529 (6th ed. 1990)).
Moreover, the majority explains that the term is also defined as "to prohibit or
restrain by a judicial order or decree." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 754
(1993)). The dissent therefore states that:
When an alien subject to a final order of removal seeks to bar
executive officials from acting upon that order pending judicial
consideration of a petition for review, the alien is seeking to
"enjoin" his or her removal. The alien is seeking an order
"restrain[ing]" those officials and "requir[ing]" them to "abstain"
from executing the order of removal.
Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990)). Moreover,
Justice Alito cites various court of appeals cases repeating the sentiment: "the term
'stay' is a subset of the broader term 'enjoin' and "a stay is a form of injunction."
Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Teshome-Gebreegziabher v.
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 330, 333 (4th Cir. 2008)); Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F.3d 583,
589 (7th Cir. 2006)). However, he does not discuss the Supreme Court's use of the
term "stay." The dissent concludes that "it is unremarkable that we have used the
word 'stay' to describe an injunction blocking an administrative order pending
judicial review." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1765 n.l (Alito, J., dissenting). However, the
dissent does not address why the separate sections exist in IIRIRA, one discussing
injunctions and the other discussing stays.
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to discuss a "stay" of judicial proceedings.214 Giving his second
reason for disagreeing with the majority, Justice Alito suggests that
the majority treats subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA as an unimportant
provision.215 Justice Alito states that the purpose of IIRIRA was to
"expedite removal and restrict the ability of aliens to remain in this
country pending judicial review,"216 and therefore subsection (f)(2)
"fits perfectly within this scheme" because the subsection "provides
that a court may not block removal during the judicial review
process." 217  Next, the dissent notes that the majority erred in its
results, noting that it is unlikely that Congress would not have
provided a standard for courts to decide whether to permit removal
while the alien awaits judicial review.218 Justice Alito's last point in
supporting this disagreement is that the majority did not provide an
adequate purpose for the existence of subsection (f)(2) if it is not to
regulate both stays and injunctions. 2 19 The third reason behind the
214. Id. at 1766. Justice Alito's first example is the Anti-Injunction Act,
which instructs that a "court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2003)). However,
most of the examples pair the term "injunction" with the term "stay" in order to
specify the meaning of "injunction." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(habeas petitioner sought injunction to stay his execution) (citing Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 578-580 (2006)). However, the dissent provides no
examples where the terms "enjoin" or "injunction" are used alone to discuss a stay,
without including the term "stay" to clarify the meaning. See generally Nken, 129
S. Ct. at 1766.
215. Id
216. Id
217. Id However, Justice Alito omits the pertinent term "enjoin" from his
analysis, because subsection (f)(2) is limited to injunctions, rather than all court
actions blocking regarding removal. See generally id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §
1252(f)(2) (2004) ("no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien . . . ."). He fails
to explain the connection between his reasoning that courts cannot "block"
removal, which seems to lump "stay" and "enjoin" together, and the statute's
language, which specifies the term "enjoin." See generally Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1766
(Alito, J., dissenting).
218. Id. Yet, the dissent once again generalizes the subsection (f)(2) standard
to control all court decisions regarding removals, rather than injunctions that this
subsection controls, as indicated by the express language of (f)(2). See generally
Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting).
219. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1766-67. Justice Alito suggests that the Court's
"hyper-technical distinction between an injunction and a stay" provides no purpose
for the existence of subsection (f)(2) if it applies only to injunctions. Id. He adds
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dissent's analysis is that the order at issue in this case is "best viewed
as an injunction" rather than a stay.220 Justice Alito adds that even if
Nken sought to "block his removal" while awaiting judicial review,
"any interim order blocking his removal would best be termed an
injunction."22' Moreover, Justice Alito notes that IIRIRA is
governed by the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2349 (2003).222
that the majority's reasoning is flawed because subsection (f)(2) operates
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." Id. However, the interpretation of
the term "enjoin" is not a provision of law but an aid to understand Congress's
meaning.
220. Id. at 1767. The dissent asserts that in the present case Nken seeks "an
order barring Executive branch officials from removing him from the country"
rather than an order that would "simply suspend judicial alteration of the status
quo." Id. Justice Alito cites a Supreme Court case where "although applicants
claimed to seek a 'stay,' the court granted an 'injunction' because 'the applicants
actually [sought] affirmative relief' against executive officials." Id. (citing
McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317 at 1317, n.1 (1976)). However, in the present
case, Nken's motion to stay removal was to a judge, rather than the Executive
Branch. See Nken, 129 S.Ct. at 1762 ("A court asked to stay removal cannot
simply assume that '[o]rdinarily, the balance of hardships will weigh heavily in the
applicant's favor."') (citing Andreiu, 253 F.3d at 484).
221. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito reasons that
when the BIA affirmed Nken's "final removal order," all legal authority was vested
in the Executive Branch so that Nken could effectively be removed from the United
States. Id.
222. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2004)). The dissent observes that the
Hobbs Act refers to an "application for an interlocutory injunction restraining or
suspending the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside" a final
order. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1767 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2349(b) (2003)). However, the
dissent omits subsection (a) of the Hobbs Act in its analysis, which states:
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of the proceeding on the
filing and service of a petition to review. The court of appeals in
which the record on review is filed, on the filing, has jurisdiction
to vacate stay orders or interlocutory injunctions previously
granted by any court, and has exclusive jurisdiction to make and
enter, on the petition, evidence, and proceedings set forth in the
record on review, a judgment determining the validity of, and
enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the
order of the agency.
28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (2003). Under this subsection, the Hobbs Act permits the
court of appeals to vacate both stays and interlocutory injunctions, but not
30-1
Consequently, Justice Alito states that Nken sought an order that
would bar his removal from the United States by the Executive
Branch, adding that Nken is not "contest[ing] the correctness of the
removal order," but wants it set aside because of social and political
changes in Cameroon.223 Therefore, the dissent concludes that an
injunction is the most accurate type of relief for Nken's motion.224
injunctions exclusively as suggested by the dissent. See generally 28 U.S.C. §
2349(a) (2003). Moreover, subsection (b) of the Hobbs Act provides:
The filing of the petition to review does not of itself stay or
suspend the operation of the order of the agency, but the court of
appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in
part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing and
determination of the petition.
28 U.S.C. § 2349(b) (1984) (emphasis added). Therefore, the court of appeals has
the authority to restrain or suspend a final order, not the Executive Branch as
suggested by the dissent. Furthermore, under the same subsection of the Hobbs
Act,
In a case in which irreparable damage would otherwise result to
the petitioner, the court of appeals may, on hearing, after
reasonable notice to the agency and to the Attorney General,
order a temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, of the
operation of the order of the agency for not more than 60 days
from the date of the order pending the hearing on the application
for the interlocutory injunction, in which case the order of the
court of appeals shall contain a specific finding, based on
evidence submitted to the court of appeals, and identified by
reference thereto, that irreparable damage would result to the
petitioner and specifying the nature of the damage. The court of
appeals, at the time of hearing the application for an interlocutory
injunction, on a like finding, may continue the temporary stay or
suspension, in whole or in part, until decision on the application.
See generally id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the fact that the IIRIRA is governed
by the Hobbs Act does not establish that subsection (f)(2) of IIRIRA must refer
only to a stay. Similarly, the Hobbs Act clearly provides the court of appeals, not
the Executive Branch, with the power to stay, unlike Justice Alito's argument that
the Executive Branch has the power to grant a stay. See generally 28 U.S.C. §
2349(b) (1984).
223. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito observes
that,"[a] motion to reopen an administrative proceeding that is no longer subject to
direct judicial review surely seeks 'an order altering the status quo."' Nken, 129 S.
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Finally, in Part Three, Justice Alito challenges the majority's
reasoning in three ways. 225 First, Justice Alito contests the majority's
view that "applying 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) would "deprive" us of our
'customary' stay power."226 The dissent justifies the use of the
subsection (f)(2) standard in the case at hand by noting that IIRIRA's
"theme" was to restrict judicial review. 22 7 Next, the dissent seeks to
undermine the majority's statement that the logical location of stays
in IIRIRA is subsection (b)(3)(B) rather than (f)(2). 228 On this point,
Justice Alito comments that he would "not read too much into
Congress' decision to locate such a provision in one subsection rather
than ... another." 229 Third, in terms of the majority's argument that
Ct. at 1767 (citing Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1758; see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
507 U.S. 1301 (1993)).
224. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1767.
225. Id. at 1767-68.
226. Id. at 1768 (citing Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1760).
227. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 486). Moreover, Justice Alito explains
that it is within Congress's authority to regulate federal courts. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at
1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S 289, 299-300 (2001).
228. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Nken, 129 S. Ct. at
1759).
229. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768. The dissent reasons that there is nothing
"unnatural" about Congress discussing a "common subject" in different
subsections. Id. Justice Alito points to other subsections discussing this review by
courts. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252 (a)(2)(A), (g)). While subsection (a)(2)(A)
broaches the subject of jurisdiction to review, subsection (g) discusses courts'
jurisdiction to hear claims. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1252 §§ (a)(2)(A), (g) (2005)). However, the sections cited by the dissent
do not discuss stays specifically. See generally Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252 §§ (a)(2)(A), (g)).
Justice Alito accounts for the use of the term "stay" in subsection (b)(3)(B)
because INA, the controlling statute regarding stays before IIRIRA, permitted
automatic stays, and thus subsection (b)(3)(B) was enacted to repeal INA's
automatic stay. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a(a)(3) (1994 ed. (repealed 1996)). Therefore,
the dissent explains that subsection (b)(3)(B) employs the word "stay" "because
that is the term that was used in the provision that it replaced." Nken, 129 S. Ct. at
1768 (Alito, 3., dissenting). However, if the term "enjoin" in subsection (f)(2) was
used to replace the term "restrain and enjoin" in subsection 242(f)(1) of the INA,
then it would seem that Congress did not intend the term "enjoin" to have a broad
meaning, but rather to include injunctions alone. See generally supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
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the higher standard of subsection (f)(2) would be "inequitable" in
removing aliens from the United States, the dissent argues that it is
IIRIRA's standard that applies where an alien desires to remain in the
United States while judicial review is pending.230 The dissent ends
by repeating that the correct standard in this case is the (f)(2)
standard and that Justice Alito would affirm the Court of Appeals'
decision.23 1
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Broad Impact
1. Increase in Immigration Appeals in the early 2000s
The primary legal impact of Nken v. Holder is that it opens up the
door for additional aliens' appeals, permissible under the law. This
trend is hardly new, however, as scholars over the past five years
have noted a dramatic increase in immigration appeals reaching the
U.S. courts of appeals.232 Beginning in the early 2000s, it seems that
a remarkable number of immigrants petitioned courts to review BIA
decisions, a number so remarkable in fact that this period has been
christened the "immigration surge." 2 33 The effect this surge had on
the legal system at that time was that it "placed a significant strain on
judicial resources, requiring courts to hire additional staff, recruit
visiting judges, and schedule extra sessions for hearing cases." 234
230. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1768 (Alito, J., dissenting). However, the dissent
seems to be using circular reasoning in its third argument. See generally id. at
1768-69. The dissent merely states that pending judicial review the appropriate
standard is that provided in subsection (f)(2), but does not explain why "this
scheme is [not] inequitable," or why (f)(2) was intended to control the action
sought by Nken. Id.
231. Id. at 1769.
232. John R.B. Palmer, Steven W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are
So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions In Federal
Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
233. Id
234. Id. Moreover, the period impacted the caseload for the Department of
Justice and immigration lawyers alike, posing a greater challenge in terms of
"scheduling orders and the mountains of appellate briefs now becoming due." Id;
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Not surprisingly, the two circuits to have been primarily affected by
this surge are the Second and Ninth circuits. 235
What was the cause of this initial surge in immigration appeals?
Although scholars initially assumed that the surge was merely a
result of a "government crackdown on undocumented aliens," they
soon discovered a different explanation.236 It seems that the actual
reason behind the transformation of the immigration system in the
2000s was "a mostly unrelated change in the way the BIA carries out
its work."2 37 A tremendous backlog of immigration cases developed;
a backlog that was at its worst in the 1990s. 238 In order to adjust to
this tremendous caseload, the BIA was forced to rely on single Board
members rather than three-member panels for case decisions as it had
in the past. 239 However, the "volume of petitions for review reaching
the federal courts began to rise almost immediately and continued to
rise as the BIA implemented further procedural changes." 240 As a
consequence, the volume of petitions for review increased five-
see also The Surge of Immigration Appeals and Its Impact on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, COMM'N ON THE FEDERAL COURTs, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., Aug. 31, 2004, available at
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/AppealSurgeReport.pdf (discussing the impact of
the immigration surge on courts of appeals); Marcia Coyle, A Swamped DOJ
Farms Out Immigration Cases, 27 NAT'L L.J. 4 (2005) (discussing the impact of
the immigration surge on the Department of Justice); Dan Eggen, Immigration
Backlog Forces Justice to Shift Staffing, WASH. PosT, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al l.
235. Palmer, supra note 232, at 3.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 4.
238. Id. In March 2002, the backlog was so bad that 56,000 cases needed to
be reviewed by BIA. Id. (citing Attorney General John Ashcroft, News
Conference, Administrative Change to Board oflmmigration Appeals, Feb. 6 2002,
available at http://www.yale.edulawweb/avalan/sept_ 1/ashcroft_011 .htm).
239. Palmer, supra note 232, at 3-4. This permitted Board members to
"summarily reject appeals through affirmances without opinion (AWOs) and
summary dismissals." Id. at 4.
240. Id Even circuit court judges noted the change. Id. Judge Jon 0.
Newman of the Second Circuit was quoted on the topic, saying "It's as if a dam
had built up a massive amount of water over the years, and then suddenly the sluice
gates were opened up and the water poured out." Id. (citing Appeals Courts
Flooded With Immigration Cases, All Things Considered (NPR broadcast Nov. 19,
2004), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4179087).
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fold.241 Thus, scholars trace the increase of appeals in part to the rise
in BIA output, explaining that when one rises, it is logical for the
other to increase. 242  Yet what is more important is that the
immigration surge (or at least the rate at which BIA decisions are
appealed) is "disproportionately large" compared to the initial
number of BIA decisions. 24 3  Therefore, the high number of
immigration appeals today may be a result of the backlog created as
early as the 1990s.
2. Opening Up the Gate for Further Immigration Appeals
Therefore, in a time where more and more immigration appeals
are materializing before the courts of appeals, it may come as a
surprise that the Court in Nken v. Holder chose a less stringent
standard, making it less difficult for immigrants to be successful in
their appeals. Although those in support of more open, or lenient,
standards of immigration may be very excited about the outcome of
Nken v. Holder, there are those who view the decision as giving too
241. Palmer, supra note 232, at 4. The article notes that the courts of appeals
received five times more petitions in 2005 as before 2002. Id. (citing DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO
IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT (2003), available at
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA8mgPDF.pdf).
242. Palmer, supra note 232, at 4.
243. Id. at 4-5. Scholars hoped that the BIA backlog would be cleared once
the new system of using single BIA members to review petitions would be used.
Id. at 4-5 n.7. Moreover, some scholars suggest that the increase in appeals from
BIA decisions results from a decrease in quality of decisions because the BIA is
understaffed, and the BIA's ability to merely summarily affirm Immigration Judge
decisions. See generally id. at 5, n.8 (citing Seeking Meaningful Review: Findings
and Recommendations in Response to Dorsey & Whitney Study of Board of
Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms, ABA COMM'N ON IMMIGR. POL'Y,
PRAC. & PRO BoNo (2003), http://www.abanet.org/immigration/bia.pdf).
However, the Department of Justice's EOIR responds that the quality of BIA
decisions is not the cause of increased appeals. Id. at 5 (citing EOIR, FACT SHEET:
BIA STREAMLINING 2 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining2004.pdf). Instead, the EOIR
reasons that the BIA's current prompt decisions prevent aliens from relying on the
BIA's lengthy backlog in order to secure extra time in this nation. Palmer, supra
note 232, at 5. Therefore, with the faster turnaround rate for BIA decisions, aliens
now have to rely on petitions for review and the apparent willingness of courts of
appeals to grant stays of removal while aliens await adjudication. Id.
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much power to the courts of appeals and making it too easy for
immigrants to fight deportation or removal orders. 24 Critics argue
that the decision nullifies IIRIRA, which was enacted to reform
immigration law.245  In particular, Lamar Smith, House Judiciary
Committee Ranking Member, who co-authored IIRIRA with Senator
Alan Simpson, states that a primary goal of IIRIRA was to "prevent
federal judges from frivolously interfering in the removal of aliens
who immigration judges had ordered removed from the United
States."246 With the Court's holding in Nken v. Holder, courts of
appeals have more discretion in weighing certain factors in their
decision of whether an appeal of a stay of removal order has merit.
Therefore, critics, including Lamar Smith, believe that this Court
opinion gives federal courts too much discretion in permitting
immigrants to remain in the United States, as opposed to the stringent
standard in IIRIRA that gives courts of appeals little power in
overturning typical orders forbidding stays of removal.247
Regardless of one's opinion of the outcome of Nken v. Holder, it is
clear that courts of appeals today will continue to have increased
discretion to stay aliens' removal orders until their cases have been
fully adjudicated. Furthermore, IIRIRA will be read narrowly, as
Congress had intended to use the term "enjoin" to include only
injunctions, and therefore affect injunctions alone.
244. "House Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Lamar Smith criticized
today's Supreme Court ruling in Nken v. Holder, calling it a 'great disservice to the
American people."' Scotus Decision Disservice to Americans, U.S. FED. NEWS,
2009 WLNR 7575491 April 23, 2009.
245. Id. This argument is an echo of Justice Alito's previously stated
reasoning. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
247. Id. "The end result will be to allow liberal federal courts free rein to
frustrate the prompt removal of criminal and illegal immigrants. The American
people deserve better." Id.
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B. Legal Impact
1. Immigration Under the Obama Administration
Is immigration reform "deader than a doornail" in the United
States ever since President Barack Obama stepped into office?248
Before being elected, President Obama often discussed his plans for
immigration reform and the importance of the issue. 249 For example,
in 2007 President Obama "vowed . . . to crusade for immigration
reform if elected president." 250 Obama was elected on November 4,
2008, to become the nation's forty-fourth president. 25 1 However,
more recently, in 2010, his critics accuse him of not being able to live
25up to their expectations.252 Some critics say that, "Obama's failure to
push immigration reform was symbolized by his State of the Union
248. Spencer S. Hsu, Chances Are Dim, But Advocates Will Still Push for
Immigration Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/31/AR2010013102081.html.
249. Kenneth R. Bazinet, Straddling Border on Immigration Issue. Do Illegals
Help - or Hurt?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 3, 2007. For instance, President Obama
was quoted as saying the following in 2007:
'The 12 million people living illegally in our country are by and
large working people who want nothing more than a better life
for themselves and their kids, and are contributing in many ways
to our country,' Obama said, citing a study that shows illegal
immigrants contributed $17.7 billion to the gross state product of
Texas in 2005.
'But even as we're a nation of immigrants, we're also a nation of
laws,' Obama said. 'We can't tolerate 2,000 people violating our
borders every day, which is why we need comprehensive
immigration reform that includes additional personnel,
infrastructure and technology on the border and at our ports of
entry.'
Id.
250. Beth Reinhard, Clinton, Obama Address La Raza, MIAMI HERALD, July
23, 2007, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/07/23/201957/clinton-
obama-address-la-raza.html.
251. Alex Johnson, Barack Obama Elected 44th President, MSNBC, Nov. 5,
2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27531033.
252. Hsu, supra note 248.
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address last Wednesday [January 27, 2010], when he devoted 38 of
about 7,300 words to the issue." 253  Others add that President
Obama's 2010 State of the Union address left Americans "little hope
that the Obama administration will try to push a comprehensive
immigration reform plan through Congress anytime soon." 254 The
apparent reasoning behind setting aside the issue of immigration is
that the President has a "full plate" in terms of legislative issues to
resolve.255 Ultimately, scholars guess that it may be another year
before the President will return to immigration reform.256
Nevertheless, the issue is a pressing one affecting Americans
more than some might like to admit. Solving the nation's
immigration problems may directly affect important problems such
as America's economy and unemployment, national security, and
253. Teresa Watanabe, Latinos Seek More Support for Immigration Reform
Illinois Congressman Tells L.A. Protesters That He Needs More Votes For a
Reform Bill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, available at:
http://articles.1atimes.com/2010/febl01/local/la-me-immig-reform2-2010feb02; see
also Hsu, supra note 248.
With time running out before lawmakers want to start focusing
on the November elections, 'immigration is deader than a
doornail,' one veteran Senate lobbyist put it. Advocates'
frustration peaked last week when Obama devoted a single
sentence in his 71 -minute State of the Union address to a topic he
ranked as a top legislative priority last summer, after health care
and an energy bill."). The thirty-eight words devoted to
immigration reform in President Obama's speech were: "And we
should continue the work of fixing our broken immigration
system, to secure our borders, and enforce our laws, and ensure
that everyone who plays by the rules can contribute to our
economy and enrich our nation.
Dan Moffett, The Wrong Issue to Delay: Immigration Deserves More Than 40
Words, PALM BEACH . POST, Feb. 2, 2010, available at:
http:www.palmbeachpost.com/opinion/columnists/the-wrong-issue-to-delay-
immigration-deserves-more-206793.html.
254. Moffett, supra note 253. Critics note that it would be difficult to
disagree with the President's thirty-eight word statement merely because of its
"perfunctory" nature. Id. ("Now, Mr. Obama may move immigration from the
back burner to the pantry for another year, if it stays in the kitchen at all.").
255. Id
256. Id
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perhaps even health care dilemmas. 257  Immigration shapes the
United States in a significant way, with a recent study showing that
twelve million illegal immigrants reside in the United States.2 58 in
terms of fixing the American economy, the UCLA study suggests
that $1.5 trillion is perhaps at stake, depending on the type of reform
measures taken to enhance the gross domestic product of the
nation.259  Moreover, in view of "[s]everal proposals in Congress
call[ing] for allowing illegal immigrants a path toward permanent
residency and citizenship if they pass background checks, learn
English, and pay fees," there may be more than just economic
benefits resulting from some type of immigration reform. 26 0  The
study discusses occurrences from the mid-1980s that allow
researchers to find that "immigrant workers who gain legal status go
on to function at higher levels in the economy and in American
society. They move on to better-paying jobs, and pay more taxes.
They become more educated, and pay more taxes. They consume
more, so they spend more, and pay more taxes."261
President Obama and his critics alike do not discuss immigration
in the context of illegal immigrants exclusively. 262 In his State of the
Union address, President Obama connected the topic of illegal
immigration to the reasoning behind permitting asylees and refugees
to remain in the United States. 263 The President added in his speech
that, "[i]n the end, it's our ideals, our values that built America,
values that allowed us to forge a nation made up of immigrants from
every corner of the globe, values that drive our citizens still." 264
257. Id.
258. Moffett, supra note 253.
259. Id. The Immigration Policy Center and the Center for American
Progress, which is said to support immigration reform, sponsored the study in
question. Id.
260. Id
261. Id. Hence, it seems that the study endorses "trickle-up economics," a
model where American workers fare better when foreign workers' conditions are
more stable. Id. Moreover, the study contemplates a hypothetical scenario where
all illegal immigrants are deported, finding that the GDP of the United States would
lose $2.6 trillion dollars over ten years because there are insufficient American
workers to fill in jobs done by illegal immigrants. Id.
262. See generally id.
263. Moffett, supra note 253.
264. Id.
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Commentators state that the UCLA study regarding immigrants
suggests similar reasoning: that the United States does not function
when so many of its residents, albeit unofficial ones, are prevented
from partaking in the nation's affairs. 265 The study therefore merges
the issue of immigration with economics, which may suggest the
social and economic impact that may result from permitting more
aliens to remain in the country by granting them asylee or refugee
status.
2. Immigration and the United States Supreme Court
Although, for the most part, immigration reform is discussed in
terms of illegal aliens by the President and critics of his actions, other
immigration issues, such as the status of asylees and refugees, remain
in the hands of the judicial system. The magnitude of the
immigration issue is perhaps best represented by the judicial branch's
recent interest in the topic. 2 66 This past term, the Supreme Court took
on four cases relating to immigration law.267 Because the Court does
not often take on this many immigration cases at a time, this
development intimates the significance of immigration to the Court,
as much as its significance to the general public. 268
265. Id. ("For America to work at its best and to endure, all of its people have
to share the same values and ideals. That can't happen when millions of residents
are excluded from participating in all the country has to offer."). Although the
study discusses economic incentives for legalizing some of the unofficial and
illegal immigrants in the country, it is silent on the effect on the immigrants
themselves. Interestingly enough, it is this reasoning discussing justice for the
immigrants, rather than economic or judicial benefits, that the majority references
in its opinion.
266. See generally Kevin Johnson, The Supreme Court's Immigration Cases
From Last Term, NEWSTEX WEB BLOGS, July 6, 2009,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/07/the-supreme-courts-
immigration-cases-from-last-term.html.
267. Id
268. Id. According to a recent CNN poll, the public in the United States
views immigration as a generally important issue, with 29% of people surveyed
who say that illegal immigration is "extremely important," 27% who deem
immigration as "important," 32% who say that it is "moderately important" and
12% stating that it is "not important." CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll,
Jan. 22-24, 2010, available at, http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm.
However, immigration is ranked fifth in terms of being the most important issue
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Moreover, the trend in these four Supreme Court cases was to
hold in favor of the immigrant, rather than the government, as three
of the four cases ruled against the Government.2 69 The first 2009
immigration case, Flores-Figueroa v. United States,270 involves
identity theft. 271 The Flores-Figueroa Court held that the element of
knowledge must be proved by prosecutors in identity fraud cases, in
that the defendant must have known a fraudulent Social Security
number belonged to a real person, as opposed to a fabricated
person. 272  Thus, a heightened standard was required of the
Government when prosecuting aggravated identity theft cases. 273
Similarly the Government lost its case in Nken v. Holder, the subject
of this case note, in which the Court held that the standard for
granting stays was more lenient towards immigrants, in tenns of
permitting more stays of removal for aliens.2 74 Next, in Negusie v.
Holder,2 75 the Court decided the issue of whether a provision of the
INA prohibits individuals who have engaged in persecution from
obtaining asylum when those individuals claim to have been forced
to persecute others by threats to their lives. 276 Once more the Court
ruled in favor of the immigrant rather than the Government, and it
reversed the BIA's decision and remanded the case so that the BIA
could consider the issue under a different standard. 2 77  The final
decision, which stands apart from the previous three in that the Court
held for the Government, is in Nifhawan v. Holder,278 a case
involving an Indian immigrant who committed mail-fraud
that the United States faces today, with 75% of the general public viewing the
economy as the biggest issue, followed by 7% for health care, 6% for the war in
Iraq, 6% for terrorism and 5% for immigration. Id.
269. Id.
270. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
271. Johnson, supra note 266.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See generally id.
275. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). Although the article states
that the case name is Negusie v. Mukasey, the correct title is Negusie v. Holder.
See generally Johnson, supra note 266.
276. Johnson, supra note 266.
277. Id.
278. Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009).
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conspiracy, among other crimes.279 In that case, the Court affirmed
the decision of an Immigration Judge, which was affirmed by the
BIA and the Court of Appeals, to remove the immigrant because he
was convicted of an aggravated felony.2 80  In that case, the
Immigration Judge was permitted to inquire into the prior
conviction's underlying facts to determine whether the conviction
was within the aggravated felony definition and victims' losses
exceeded $10,000.281
The broader impact resulting from these latest Supreme Court
cases is perhaps a limit on the Bush administration's "extreme
position" on immigration-related matters. 282 The statement the Court
seems to be making in these four cases is that "[t]he Bush
administration made arguments that ran counter to the Courts [sic]
general tendency in [the] areas [of statutory interpretation, equitable
principles, and agency deference]" when dealing with immigrants.2 83
Therefore, it has been argued that immigration is not merely a
politicized issue, but one that requires careful reading of the law
rather than decisions based only on the policies of a given
administration. 2 84  Although immigration may not be a central
legislative issue for the President this year, it seems as though the
Supreme Court's has in turn put the issue at the forefront of its
agenda.2 85 Therefore, in the near future, it is likely that immigrants
will fare well in the hands of this Court, particularly in cases where
the previous administration attempted to change traditional legal
standards.
279. Johnson, supra note 266.
280. Id.
281. Id
282. Id
283. Johnson, supra note 266.
284. See generally id.
285. See generally id. The Supreme Court's increased interest in immigration
law is mirrored by the visibility of courts of appeals' attention to the topic. See
generally Linda Kelly Hill, The Poetic Justice ofImmigration, 42 INDIANA L. REV.
1 (2009). However, scholars have noted that because the courts of appeals have
been inundated with immigration appeals more recently, treatment of the issue and
immigrants in general has been generally negative. See generally id. (discussing
the negative rhetoric used in discussions regarding immigrants, illegal aliens and
refugees by the federal courts of appeals).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Nken, with its literal interpretation of the
IIRIRA statute, empowers courts to make independent decisions of
whether or not to grant a stay to an alien who has been ordered to be
removed, or deported. Although the Court does not articulate this
reasoning, it has been suggested that recent Supreme Court opinions
reflect the Court's disapproval of the treatment immigration has been
getting from Congress, and the most recent presidents of this
country.2 86  Similarly, courts of appeals are swamped with
immigration appeals, and have been treating immigration
unfavorably as a result of a surge in appeals. In the majority's words,
the Court hoped to give judges additional time to decide immigration
cases, relieving the pressure of getting a decision right in a brief
time.287 The present case is framed in terms of asking whether a stay
and an injunction are one and the same, or if injunctions do not
encompass stays. Nevertheless, with its final holding, the majority
makes it clear that the overarching matter at stake is the need for
time, both for courts' and immigrants' sakes.288
Ultimately, the Nken decision centers on the core principles of
this country, a nation founded by individuals hoping to find a place to
live free from oppression.2 89  In a time when humanitarian and
environmental atrocities are occurring throughout the world,290 it has
been argued that it is critical to weigh the risks to aliens' safety when
deciding whether to deport them as they await possibly life-changing
judicial decisions. Echoing the majority's reasoning that courts'
decisions may come too late if a stay of removal is not granted before
adjudication is final, Nken's attorney stated in an interview: "It's a
case that could really literally mean life or death for my client . . . If
he were deported while his appeal was pending, he is likely to be
286. Johnson, supra note 266.
287. See generally Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1754 ('No court can make time stand
still' while it considers an appeal . . . and if a court makes takes the time it needs,
the court's decision may in some cases come too late for the party seeking
review.").
288. See id.
289. See generally Krezalek, supra note 12, at 281.
290. Including the earthquake in Haiti, genocide in the Sudan, sex tourism in
various parts of Asia, for example.
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killed or jailed or tortured in Cameroon." 29 1 In many ways, the
outcome of this case affected immigrants such as Nken by giving
them the chance to remain safely within the United States until their
case has been finally decided. Although some argue that this
undermines the efficiency of the judicial process, those that support
the outcome achieved here respond that it takes time to achieve
justice. All things considered, the Court's opinion in Nken
reaffirmed the traditional judicial power of granting stays when time
is of the essence. Its purpose was to remind Congress, the President,
and the general public that courts need the authority to determine the
credibility of individuals applying for asylum in order to serve this
nation and justice, on the whole.
291. Jenner & Block Associate Scores SCOTUS Win, Dealbreaker: Above the
Law, 2009 WLNR 7813462, Apr. 22, 2009.
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